Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

I
n this paper I focus on the determinants of the decision by individuals to cross the border to shop and test the predictions of the model developed for that purpose on Canadian monthly border crossing data for the period running between 1972 and 1997. For economists and policy makers, cross border travel is of particular interest because of its close association with sales tax evasion and, as such, this paper forms part of the growing literature on international integration and its impact on tax structure (see Kanbur and Keen, 1993) . Most often mobility (whether it is product, capital, or labor mobility) is seen as a byproduct of or constraint on the game theoretic fiscal competition that arises among the regions of a single state and hence is most often tested on interstate or provincial mobility (e.g., Mintz and Tulkens, 1986; Trandel, 1992 Trandel, , 1994 and Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby, 1991) . Here I utilize the extensive data available on international border crossings to test a shopping model that has implications for tax evasion through the return flow of shoppers.
The motivation for this paper arises from a brief consideration of the set of policy choices faced by Canada in the period leading into and immediately following the Free Trade Agreement with the United States in January, 1989 . With the prospect of fewer barriers to the movement of both goods and factors across the Canada-U.S. border, policy makers entered a new environment where international factor mobility made problematic traditional responses to changes in tax levels and tax instruments. In particular, Canadian policy makers appeared to recognize that continued reliance on a relatively high manufacturer's sales tax would likely reduce the level of manufacturing in Canada and lead to its relocation into the United States. This began a period of iterative policy response as Canada abandoned the use of a high, narrow producer tax (the manufacturer's sales tax) and adopted a lower, more general value added tax (the Goods and Services Tax, GST). Some of the behavioral responses to the new policy regime for cross border shopping have been recognized already. Di Matteo (1993) , for example, has documented the higher flow of cross border travel that followed the introduction of the GST and more recent theoretical analysis has focused on the gain in private consumer utility from cross border tax evasion and questioned whether net social gains can be produced by tighter enforcement of border crossing regulations (Lovely, 1994 (Lovely, , 1995 . My analysis focuses on the broader determinants of cross border shopping of which tax evasion represents only one dimension.
At bottom, however, a policy that raises the benefit or reduces the cost of crossing the border to evade taxes has social significance because it limits the revenue that can be raised from the current tax structure and hence increases the cost of providing goods and services through the government. Moreover, the distortion created by the misperception that individuals can escape taxation by cross border shopping can be expected to prompt further change as policy makers respond to the altered cost of using traditional taxes and maintaining the same regulatory environment. As we will see, Canada appears to have used a wider range of response to trading openness than would usually have been considered. Of particular interest is the suggestion in the data that shopping regulations responded to the incentives created by the opportunity to evade taxes that arise in more open markets.
The analysis begins by adopting a model developed by Lovely (1994) to analyze cross border tax evasion and enforcement alternatives. Rather than use the model to examine the welfare issues raised by cross border shopping, the model is used positively to predict the determinants of cross border shopping. Next the comparative static effects on the number of cross border shopping trips following changes in the costs and benefits of cross border shopping are presented. The next section describes the data used in the tests and is followed by the empirical results. The equation estimates are then used to measure the size of the expected tax losses that follow the introduction of the GST in Canada and this estimate is compared with other evidence on the aggregate size of the tax evasion tax loss. The paper concludes with lessons learned.
THE BASIC MODEL
Consider an open economy with a large number of identical price-taking consumers (normalized to one for convenience). Consumers are assumed to treat similar goods identically even if produced in a different country and thus see themselves as being able to purchase goods from two sources: an internal retail market (that sells both domestic goods and legal imports) and an external market (where foreign produced goodscan be purchased but must be smuggled in for domestic consumption). To distinguish between types of goods, I denote goods that cannot be smuggledwith the sub-script n, while goods that can be smuggled are given the subscript s. 1 Superscripts are used to indicate their production origin as either domestic, d, or foreign, f. Using these distinctions, aggregate domestic consumption will consist of both types of goods, C s and C n . Nonsmuggled consumption goods are produced domestically (so that C n = C n d ), while goods that can be smuggled are either produced domestically, C d s , or in the foreign country, C s f . Because crossing the border to shop is costly in terms of time lost from work or leisure, individuals will prefer to shop in domestic retail stores (ceteris paribus). On occasion, however, cross border shopping becomes desirable and the extra time and effort required to cross the border adds a travel cost that is largely independent of the number of purchases. This means that cross border shopping will take place discretely in time and suggests that cross border shopping can be metered by the number of shopping trips, n.
2 Because cross border shopping typically involves the use of a car, the quantity and type of goods that can be safely brought back without detection each trip is strictly limited. Using c s f to denote the bundle of goods purchased in a representative cross border shopping trip, C s f = nc s f . In the model below, c s f is taken as a parameter whose size implies n > 1. This assumption is more fully motivated in the data section below.
The consumer's shopping decision is modeled by assuming that the representative consumer maximizes a utility function that is strictly concave with continuous first and second derivatives in the arguments: consumption, leisure, and government services. That is:
where the C's represent units of the two consumption goods; l represents hours of leisure; and g represents the level of government spending (assumed exogenous to each consumer). The latter assumption introduces a fiscal externality into the model in that individuals believe that the government services they receive are independent of their consumption and work decisions (despite being linked directly through the government budget constraint).
Each consumer is constrained by both income and time. The income constraint of the representative individual is written in units of the domestic currency as:
where e is the domestic price of foreign currency (number of Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar); p s and p n represent, respectively, the domestic price of goods that can and cannot be smuggled; p s f is the price of smuggled goods in the foreign currency; w is the hourly wage; h is the number of hours worked; and t is the common domestic commodity tax rate.
The second constraint accounts for time and is represented as:
Here H represents the maximum number of hours available; h, the number of hours spent in work; n, the number of cross 1 Smuggled goods, as used in the text, fall into one of two categories: goods brought in legally through narrow (e.g., art) or broad (e.g., all goods purchased within duty free limits) exemptions in custom duties and goods brought in illegally. Same-day cross border shopping, the focus of this analysis, has no duty free exemption so that the method of bringing in goods (usually by car) and the necessity of hiding undeclared imports defines the subset of goods that can be smuggled and the use of trips as a meter of smuggled quantities. 2 Kanbur and Keen (1993) locate households across space so that distant households face a higher cost of crossing the border to purchase a fixed quantity of goods. My analysis focuses on a representative household who purchases a variable quantity of goods by changing the number of shopping trips. In this sense my analysis focuses on the intensive margin while Kanbur and Keen focus on the extensive margin.
border shopping trips; and δ, the hours spent on each cross border shopping trip. Finally, g is used to represent units of a public good that can be produced at a constant cost, c g . Public goods are financed by a common commodity tax rate, t, levied on all goods sold domestically. Normalizing the measure of government services to produce a marginal cost equal to one the government budget constraint becomes:
Government spending is set exogenously so that the tax rate becomes a residual in this analysis. The tax rate then adjusts automatically so that the collections needed to finance g are consistent with the level and composition of private consumption.
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Substituting the income and time constraints of equations [2] and [3] directly into the utility function eliminates two of the interdependent choice variables (C n d and l) from explicit analysis. 4 After substitution the objective function becomes quasi-concave and a maximum can still be found. Writing this out explicitly, the maximization problem becomes:
Equation [5] formalizes the case where the individual does not recognize the link between tax collections and government services and believes that he or she can free ride on the provision of government services by avoiding tax payments through cross border shopping. The first order conditions for the internal optimum when the individual buys the good that can be smuggled in both the foreign country and domestic market are:
where [6] has been used in [7] to allow a more intuitive interpretation. From [7] note that n > 0 requires 1 -ep s f /(1 + t)p s > 0; that is, the full price of the domestic good that can be smuggled, (1 + t)p s , must exceed the domestic price of the foreign good, ep s f , for cross border shopping to become economic. An interior solution can then arise in which the individual purchases goods that can be smuggled in both the domestic and foreign market because of the assumption that cross border shopping is relatively time intensive and the utility function exhibits diminishing returns to leisure.
The first order conditions describe the three margins of choice that form the basis for the model's predictions. Given the interior solution, equation [6] describes the optimal consumption choice across domestic good types as one where the individual will increase consumption of the domestic good that can be smuggled as long as the net utility gain exceeds the loss arising from the reduced consumption of goods that cannot be smuggled. In the domestic market, both goods are subject 3 The addition of a theory of government allows analysis of the welfare implications of the model. Hence a Leviathan theory will generate a level of government that is too large (relative to individual preferences) while a model with free riding hypothesis generates a level too small. 4 Recognizing that C s = C s d + nc s f allows rewriting the budget constraint to solve for
. Substituting the government budget constraint directly into the utility function would force recognition of the consequences of individual behaviour on the level of government services, internalizing the fiscal externality. 5 After substituting for C n d in g, the two C s d terms cancel.
to the same tax rate. Equation [7] describes the condition for the optimal number of cross border shopping trips as one where the individual continues to cross the border and shop as long as the net utility received by purchasing the set of foreign goods at a lower price (in domestic currency) exceeds the utility cost of foregone leisure. Finally, equation [8] establishes the optimal labour/leisure choice by balancing the loss in utility from working longer hours (lost leisure) against the gain from higher income and consumption (in terms of the marginal utility of goods not smuggled). In making this tradeoff, the individual does not include the net utility gain that arises from the additional government services arising from higher realized taxes.
Equations [6] , [7] and [8] , together with the government budget constraint in [4] and a rule for determining government size, are sufficient to solve for the representative individual's optimal trading plan. If the country is a small open economy (like Canada), these conditions are sufficient to describe the choices made.
COMPARATIVE STATICS
In this section I derive the predictions that are tested in the empirical analysis. In particular, equations [6] , [7] , and [8] are used to solve for the change in the number of cross border shopping trips that follow from changes in: the foreign price of goods that can be smuggled, p s f ; the domestic commodity tax rate (price), t (p s ); the exchange rate, e; the quantity of goods that can be feasibly smuggled on each shopping trip, c s f ; the time required to travel, δ; and the wage rate, w. While most of these variables have a straightforward counterpart in the data, changes in the time cost of shopping abroad instead of at home are not directly observable. This led me to consider changes in institutional arrangements that might be expected to affect border crossing times as proxies for δ. For example, the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement (USFTA) beginning in January, 1989 would be expected to reduce the time and administrative ease of crossing the border and hence correspond to a fall in δ in the model. Formal presentation of the comparative static results are available from the author on request. Here I simply report the qualitative model predictions as: dn/dp s f < 0; dn/ dt > 0; dn/de < 0; dn/dc s f > 0; dn/dδ < 0; and dn/dw < 0. The first two terms reflect changes in the relative price of goods that can be smuggled and the effect this is expected to have on cross border shopping. An increase in the foreign price raises the relative price directly while an increase in the domestic commodity tax rate raises the domestic price, so lowering the relative price of the foreign good. In either case, an increase in the relative price of foreign goods will reduce the value of cross border shopping and hence reduce the number of cross border trips. These two changes work as described only if the exchange rate is held constant. Offsetting movements in the exchange rate could undo the relative change in cross-country prices. More generally, any increase in the exchange rate (i.e., an increase in the number of Canadian dollars needed to acquire a U. S. dollar) will raise the domestic cost of acquiring the same good in the U.S. and so lead to a fall in Canadian cross border shopping. On the other hand, an increase in the number of foreign goods that can be brought back easily on each shopping trip without paying the domestic tax is expected to increase the number of cross border shopping trips. 6 Note again that this result reflects the assumption that border enforcement limits "artificially" the number of purchases made each trip so that smuggling remains intramarginal. In this case raised exemptions, less enforcement, and/or newer smuggling techniques allow lower cost foreign goods to replace higher cost domestic goods so that the marginal value of an additional trip comes to exceed the higher time cost of cross border shopping. The opposite result would arise if cross border shoppers exhaust the desired commodity margin so that fewer trips are now needed to purchase the same quantity of goods.
Lastly, any increase in the time required to cross the border and shop (relative to domestic alternatives) or an increase in the value of that time (as represented by a rise in the wage rate) is predicted to decrease cross border shopping. These predictions are tested and the size of the estimated effects quantified below.
THE DATA
The major difficulty associated with testing the shopping model is that the activity of crossing the border to evade commodity taxes is illegal and must be inferred from data collected for other purposes. Hence the test below focuses on the number of individuals crossing the border (rather than the shopping trip) and the regression analysis uses same-day crossings by automobile [AUTOS] and by individuals in automobiles [SAMEDAY] as a proxy for cross border shopping trips. While there are many reasons for crossing the border, same-day shopping trips to Burlington or Massena (from Montreal), Watertown (from Ottawa and Kingston), Buffalo (from Toronto), Detroit (from Windsor), and Bellingham (from Vancouver) have long been used by Canadians to stock up on relatively high priced Canadian goods and for this reason same-day crossings are often used as the barometer of the scale of cross border shopping activity for policy analysis (e.g., Di Matteo, 1993) .
7 However, while cross border travel may accurately measure the movement of consumers to foreign goods, commodity taxes can also be evaded by having goods brought to consumers by professional smugglers. The absence of reliable data on changes in organized smuggling flows can then bias an analysis that measures evasion solely by focusing on individual crossings. For example, in late 1993 and early 1994 organized tobacco smuggling into Canada became so prevalent that the domestic retail market for tobacco in Quebec and Ontario was virtually eliminated. For this time period, the widespread availability of smuggled tobacco inside Canada reduced cross border travel for tobacco products to a trickle. In this particular case, the large loss in tax revenue and fear of the public's growing acceptance of tobacco smuggling led Canada's governments to cooperate and drastically drop (in February, 1994) specific federal and provincial tobacco taxes to remove the incentive to smuggle.
8
While such episodes remain the exception rather than the rule, it is important to remember that same-day travel is simply a meter rather than a precise measure of the extent of tax evasion. 9 Figure 1 presents the monthly time series of individual same-day border crossings from Canada to the U.S. between January, 1972 and December, 1997 (312 observations) . I also include on that dia-7 Same-day travel has no federal import duty exemption (while increasing exemptions are given after twentyfour hours, forty-eight hours, and one week abroad) so that all goods purchased outside should be declared for the payment of the appropriate federal and provincial taxes. Despite this requirement, considerable numbers of Canadians have at one time or another crossed the border to engage in same-day shopping without declaring their purchases. 8 Early empirical work for the province of Quebec showed no same-day crossing response to tax inclusive changes in cigarette prices despite Quebec's growing tax differential with the U.S., a relatively large smoking population, and a short travel distance to the U.S. This became more understandable once it was recognized that by 1993 the scale of organized cigarette smuggling had made personal travel redundant. Note, however, that Quebec remains an anomaly in relation to its response to extended opening hours (see the regression equations below). 9 The positive aspect of border crossing data is that because governments do monitor their borders, the data collected does allow particular focus on the trip. That is, domestic wholesale and retail data typically relate to stores or products, while most shopping hypotheses emphasize the time cost of shopping and so generate predictions in terms of numbers of trips.
gram the exchange rate (measured as the number of Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar). This illustrates that more than simply the exchange rate is needed to explain cross border travel. Perhaps what is most apparent from the same-day series is its repetitive seasonal pattern. Of greater significance for the shopping hypothesis, however, is the dramatic rise and fall in travel that takes place towards the end of the time period. Between 1987 and 1992, same-day cross border travel more than doubled and even by the end of the time period in 1997, same-day crossings were running at a rate that was 50 percent higher than at the beginning. What is less clear from the figure is that this time series (SAMEDAY) is also nonstationary.
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To achieve stationarity (required for statistical testing), the series was first differenced. Using the difference operator D to represent first differences, the tests presented below use D(SAMEDAY) as their primary dependent variable. To test for the robustness of the "individual" measure of cross border shopping, however, I also used the number of automobiles making same-day crossings (AU-TOS). AUTOS shared the time series characteristics of SAMEDAY and so were first differenced to generate the alternative dependent variable D(AUTOS).
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Testing the shopping hypothesis in first difference form is consistent with the time series properties of the other key independent variables of the analysis (i.e., the rela- Figure 1 . Same-day Border Crossings: 1972 :01-1997 10 The adjusted Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic for SAMEDAY is -3.08, below (in absolute terms) the MacKinnon critical value of -3.45 at 1 percent and only marginally above the 5 percent critical value of -2.87. In first differences, the ADF statistic becomes -8.703, which is consistent with stationarity. 11 The ADF test statistics for AUTOS are -2.141 in levels and -8.815 in first differences.
tive price ratio and the exchange rate are also integrated of order one).
12 However, the use of first differences alone will lead to the loss of potential information that might be inferred from the relationship among the levels of the variables. Because the levels of a set of variables may be cointegrated despite being individually nonstationary, I tested for the stationarity of the residuals of the regression equation when run in levels. The possibility of an error correction relationship was suggested by the ADF test statistics of the residuals of the SAMEDAY and AUTOS regression equations-taking the values -4.95 and -7.42, respectively, both of which exceed (in absolute terms) the 1 percent critical MacKinnon value (-3.45 ). An error correction formulation then adds to the first difference form of the regression equation a term to reflect the lagged error term of the same equation when run in levels (the error correction term). The predicted sign of the coefficient of the error correction term is negative (indicating convergence). Its significance would signal the presence of a convergent process by which individuals adjust their shopping trips to past deviations (errors) of actual from desired levels of crossing. As importantly, the presence of the error correction term corrects for bias in the estimated fit of a simple first difference equation (by accounting for an otherwise unexplained adjustment process) and allows for more precision in the identification of each hypothesized relationship. The error correction model used to test the predictions of the model below estimates the longer run error correction term and the shorter run first difference relationship simultaneously. This allows a direct estimate of both the short and long run response of cross border same-day travel to each of the model's key variables.
While higher commodity taxes may create a general incentive for Canadians to cross the border and shop, the particular commodities purchased on that trip depend upon the ability of shoppers to bring them back undetected. Because all undeclared same-day retail purchases are illegal, only a subset of potentially profitable commodities will be purchased and these will be chosen as much for their smuggling characteristics as for the benefit generated by commodity tax evasion. 13 The characteristics needed for smuggling are readily apparent-small in size, high in realizable savings, and low in visibilityand these criteria were used to pick a subset of potential commodities to measure the dimension of the smuggling bundle. In addition, virtually all cross border shopping is done by car and travel by car permits a relatively small number of ways of avoiding superficial detection at the border. It is this inability to smuggle more than small quantities at relatively low cost that motivates our assumption that c s f , the bundle size, is fixed. Without this rising cost of detection, increases in tax differences could well result in larger purchases per trip rather than a larger number of trips.
Five particular commodity classes were chosen to meter the price incentive to cross border shop: apparel, food, gasoline, tobacco, and liquor. Apparel and gasoline are natural candidates for inclusion in the 12 The ratios of both exchange rates and unadjusted relative prices are all nonstationarity in their levels. The ADF test statistics all fall short of the critical MacKinnon value of -3.45 for levels and exceeded it for first differences. The ADF values for EXCH and the relative price of the smuggling bundle (PRBUNDLE) are, respectively, -0.905 and -1.55 in levels and -7.91 and -7.38 in first differences. 13 While the analysis focuses on smuggling, the same factors are at work if differences in commodity taxes and import duties allow for profitable declaration on return. Throughout the early part of our time period, a Canadian returning from the U.S. could bring back duty free: $20 worth of products after twenty-four hours; $100 after forty-eight hours; and $300 after seven days, with further restrictions on the quantity of tobacco and liquor that could be imported duty free. On June 13, 1995 these limits rose to $50, $200, and $500 (without, however, introducing exemptions for same-day travel).
smuggling bundle since the scale of legitimate trade in these products makes the detection of place of purchase virtually impossible if done in small quantities.
14 The period of construction of "U.S. factory outlet" clothing stores adjacent to the Canadian border in the early 1990s seemed to be designed precisely to accommodate this purpose. 15 Food is present in the list not for sales tax reasons (food products being exempted from sales taxes in Canada) but because Canada relies to a greater degree than does the U.S. on marketing boards to control domestic agricultural supplies. This has increased the Canadian price of common food products like milk, poultry, and eggs well above their U.S. counterpart. Tobacco and liquor are both heavily taxed in Canada relative to the U.S. They are also small in size, high in savings value, and relatively easy to smuggle by car. Higher prices in the U.S. relative to Canada are then expected to decrease cross border shopping in the U.S. and lower the number of Canadians making same-day crossings. This will be true whether the relative price rises for tax or other reasons.
While each commodity class presents one reason for crossing the border to shop, the individual significance of each commodity price is not necessary for a test of the cross border shopping hypothesis. The shopping hypothesis relates to the trip and the trip is driven not so much by the savings made on each individual commodity as by the aggregate savings realized from the bundle of goods purchased. In this sense, individually adverse price changes need not deter border crossings if the benefits received in the rest of the bundle merit travel. The price prediction that arises from the model is then that the coefficient on a price index of some bundle of smuggleable goods [PRBUNDLE] will be negative. The results given in Table 1 are for an index that weighs each commodity group equally in the aggregate. Experimentation over a wide range of different weights, however, produced no significant difference in findings. 16 The exchange rate is often viewed in the popular press as the key determinant of cross border shopping and the close correspondence of exchange rate movements with same-day cross border travel in the early 1990s (as represented in Figure 1 ) underlies such reasoning. My empirical work enters the exchange rate [EXCH] as a separate determinant of cross border shopping. An increase in the exchange rate, measured in the empirical work as an increase in the number of Canadian dollars needed to purchase one U.S. dollar, reduces the incentive to smuggle by increasing the real cost of U.S. goods to Canadians and so is expected to lead to a decline in cross border travel. The predicted coefficient sign is negative. The presence of the exchange rate in a regression that already includes the relative price of goods that are most likely to be smuggled allows the regression to identify the separate reasons why a change in 14 Very few Canadians, for example, take the Cornwall crossing back into Canada without filling up at the Indian reservation. The inability to distinguish the origin of the gasoline makes this form of smuggling virtually undetectable. Often smuggling consists of more than simply filling up a full automobile gas tank before returning to Canada. The Globe and Mail (August 16, 1993) reports the following tax evasion strategy. A gas tanker capable of carrying 40,000 liters of gasoline can pick up two separate half loads of gasoline in the U.S. and declare only half the load coming into Canada. The full load is then sold to Ontario gasoline stations. Then, because gasoline exports from Canada are exempt from the federal tax of 9 cents a liter and the road tax of 15 cents a liter, the returning tanker can purchase gasoline in Ontario and sell it locally while exporting water to the U.S. The Globe and Mail estimates that this scam can earn $9600 on gasoline never sent to the U.S. 15 As mentioned by one of the referees, the discreteness of mall construction adds a type of hysteresis into cross border shopping flows, perhaps helping to explain the long adjustment process suggested by the data. 16 Any weighting scheme that increases the size of the weights going to tobacco, gasoline, and liquor products prices increases the significance of the price of the bundled group. Increasing the weight given to apparel and food prices decreases the significance of the bundled price. 
the relative price may induce cross border shopping-i.e., in response to specific price changes or in response to changes in the relative shopping power of the two currencies.
17 Because the exchange rate will change to reflect such factors as interest rate differentials and changes in resource prices, changes in the relative value of the dollar will capture other relative price effects that may be unrelated to changes in either the tax regime or specialized commodity prices.
The absence of a monthly wage series requires more creative use of available data to test for changes in the real value of time on cross border shopping. The availability of the monthly alternative, the unemployment rate, suggests the hypothesis that when unemployment is high, the relative lack of market alternatives will lower the cost of time intensive shopping and hence raise cross border travel. On the other hand, because the unemployment rate also tracks the business cycle, increases in unemployment will reflect lower income and hence times when shopping has less value. To measure the size of these offsetting effects I used a Hodrick-Prescott filter to separate the change in the unemployment series into two parts: first, the Hodrick-Prescott trend [HPURATE] taken to reflect income effects associated with permanent levels of unemployment; and second, the deviation of unemployment from its HodrickPrescott trend [DEVURATE] . Positive values of the latter are then taken to represent periods of temporary unemployment, where the short run absence of work leaves time available for shopping. 18 Increases in DEVURATE will increase, while increases in HPURATE decrease, cross border shopping.
In addition to these continuous explanatory variables, the regressions include a set of discrete variables to account for the normal seasonal pattern of border crossings between the United States and Canada that may not be related to shopping. Weather is the obvious factor underlying the seasonal pattern of cross border travel, explaining the consistent fall in same-day cross border travel each winter and the corresponding rise each spring and summer. The potential bias that seasonal effects might introduce is removed by including centered seasonal dummies for each month between February and December.
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With this background, we arrive at the discrete variables used to test the effects predicted to arise from the regime changes of this time period. They test the premise that individuals crossing the border to take advantage of relative price differences between countries will also respond to changes in the institutional, regulatory, and tax regimes that underlie the shopping environment. Because the free trade agreement would be expected to lower the administrative time and inconvenience cost of crossing the border, the analysis predicts that the USFTA should increase cross border travel. 20 This is tested by in-cluding in the regression equation a dummy variable (USFTA) taking the value of 0 for all months through the end of 1988 and 1 from January 1989 onward. A positive coefficient on D(USFTA) would be needed to be consistent with the predicted permanent rise in the level of cross border travel following the treaty. The second major regime change facing Canadian shoppers was the introduction of the GST. In January, 1991 the Canadian federal government removed a 13.5 percent manufacturers sales tax and replaced it with a 7 percent value added tax on most goods and services.
21 Within Canada, the tax regime change raised some final good prices while lowering others;
22 however across the two countries, the presence of the GST raised discretely the final retail price in Canada relative to the price paid for the same good if purchased in the U.S. and not declared at the border when returning. By permanently lowering the smuggled relative price of U.S. retail goods, the GST is predicted to have permanently increased cross border shopping by Canadians. A test for the effect of the GST, however, is already implicit in the form of the regression equation through the GST induced change in the relative price of the bundle [PRBUNDLE] . Should the regime change also have changed the relative prices of goods not in the smuggling bundle and result in a change in the exchange rate, there would be an additional effect on cross border shopping through EXCH. In the next section, an effort is made to assess this claim and present an estimate of the size of the tax loss associated arising from cross border efforts to evade the GST.
Thirdly, the use of the border to evade commodity taxes such as the GST would be expected to provoke governments sensitive to tax revenue losses to respond along all policy margins, including the institutional dimensions of retail markets subject to different rules and regulations. 23 The prohibition of Sunday shopping within Canada in this period, for example, was often given as one reason why U.S. retailers might hold a competitive advantage for those Canadian customers living near (or adjacent to) the border. Hence, when falling exchange rates and border crossing costs led to the major expansion of cross border shopping in the early nineties, the devastation of retail trade in Canadian cities close to the border (e.g., Cornwall and Windsor) placed both local and provincial governments under pressure to "level the playing field" by changing traditional retail shopping arrangements. The concern over cross border shopping then became an important reason why a number of provincial governments either deregulated aspects of Sunday shopping (as did Quebec in July, 1990) and/or repealed laws that prohibited late night and Sunday openings (as did Ontario in July, 1993). To test for the significance of institutional change, the dating of the change poses an interesting additional test of the shopping hypothesis. For example, in June, 1992, then Premier Bob Rae of Ontario, announced his intention to repeal existing Sunday closing legislation (implying that existing closing laws would not be enforced immediately). 21 The major exemptions are food and children's clothing. See Ruggeri and Bluck (1990) for a more detailed analysis of the incidence of the GST. 22 Because the GST substituted for another tax (and was designed to be revenue neutral), not all Canadian prices would rise by the full amount of the tax (i.e., 7 percent). Statistics Canada estimates that 4.4 percent of the previous average retail store price was accounted for by the federal manufacturers sales tax. On net, the GST appears to account for a discrete jump in the Canadian consumer price index (CPI) of 3.3 percent (i.e., the CPI rose from 121.0 in December to 125.0 in January, 1991, 1986 = 100). 23 Trandel (1992) explores another dimension of retail competition using spatial analysis. In his case, an open border and the ability to evade commodity taxation reduces local market power and hence offsets the welfare loss associated with foregone tax revenues. Table 1 presents the error correction formulation of the test of the shopping hypothesis. That formulation has the first differences of the explanatory variables (levels for the monthly dummies) and an error correction term regressed against the first differences of two measures of cross border shopping (same-day individual and automobile crossings). As discussed earlier, the appropriateness of the error correction model is indicated by stationarity in the residuals when the ordinary least squares (OLS) equation is run in levels. 25 The "error" in the error correction model is derived simultaneously by nesting the lagged estimating equation in levels within the first difference form (rather than doing the estimation in two separate steps).
TESTS OF THE MODEL
26 By using this procedure and presenting the coefficients of both the first differences and the error correction term, the table allows both the impact and long run effects of parameter changes to be discussed. Finally, the equations included centered monthly seasonal dummies and lagged dependent and independent variables to account for the long and protracted adjustment process found in the data. More formally, the stochastic difference equation estimated can be written as: [9] where y t represents either individual or automobile daily crossings, x it represents the set of eight independent variables, and λ represents the error correction coefficient. Only those lagged variables that were found to be significantly different from zero were kept in the equations presented in Table 1. 27 While the coefficients of the contemporaneous first difference term measures the short run effect, the coefficients of lagged variables in levels in the error correction term need to be adjusted before the long run effect on cross border shopping can be isolated. In this case the long run effect can be determined as (-λ)ν i .
By inspection, the pattern of results represented by the set of equations as a whole can be seen to be broadly consistent both with each other and with the shopping hypothesis outlined above. Each equation accounts for more than 85 percent of the 24 Note that all of the shopping regime dummy variables were given the value 0 in each month before the date given in the text and a 1 in the month of change and the months following. 25 The ADF test statistic for the residuals of the SAMEDAY/AUTOS regression equations in levels were -4.95/ -7.42, both of which exceed (in absolute terms) the 1 percent critical MacKinnon value (-3.45). The size of coefficient estimate, however, was close to zero, implying an adjustment interval that is long enough to, perhaps, mimic aspects of a unit root. 26 The error correction coefficient estimates when run in two separate stages were -0.090 (2.60) for SAMEDAY and -0.103 (2.44) for AUTOS. 27 The resulting equations minimized the Akaike information criterion.
National Tax Journal Vol. 53 no. 4 Part 1 (December 2000) pp. monthly variation in first differences. Tempering this is the consideration that much of the variability is explained by the seasonal monthly dummies and lagged dependent variables. On the other hand, the inclusion of these terms does result in residuals that are largely free of autocorrelation, increasing confidence that the standard errors are not biased by correlation among the residuals. 28 When one focuses on the set of nine predictions-eight variables (plus lags) used in both the short and long run parts of the equation and the error correction coefficient (all bolded in the table)-fully 30 of the model's 37 coefficient estimates have their predicted sign and of these 16 (22) are significantly different from zero when the 5 (10) percent level of significance is used. 29 More formally, Wald tests of the hypothesis that the set of shopping variables are jointly insignificant can be rejected at the 1 percent confidence level for both the short and long run. 30 Finally, the explanatory power of the error correction process is signaled by the significantly negative error correction coefficient found in both forms of the test. This confirms the conjecture that a stable statistical relationship exists among the levels of the variables and hence is consistent with the hypothesis that an equilibrium economic relationship has been identified.
Turning to the individual cross border shopping coefficients in Table 1 , both aspects of the relative shopping price-the unadjusted ratio of bundled commodity prices, PRBUNDLE, and the exchange rate, EXCH-are strongly consistent with the predictions of the model. In all cases the coefficients are negative and almost all are significantly different from zero (using the 5 percent confidence interval).
31
Comparing the two equations, the number of individuals who cross the border in response to changes in product prices vary more than do the number of automobiles, suggesting, perhaps, that it is less costly to add an additional shopper to a car than to add an additional car to make shopping trips. In addition, both sets of findings suggest a long and varied pattern of adjustment before equilibrium is reached. The long run coefficients derived from the error correction term, for example, suggest that the immediate quantity response to a relative price change will overshoot the longer run equilibrium. To see this, note that the coefficients of the error correction term must be multiplied by the error correction term to find the 28 The presence of lagged dependent variables in the regression equation means that the Durbin Watson statistic is no longer valid. The alternative Ljung-Box Q-statistic is reported in the table together with the associated probability of no serial correlation up to lag length 14. 29 When the equations were run with each commodity price included separately rather than as a tied bundle, some individual price predictions were not supported. As discussed earlier, the model does imply that the bundle should be more significant as a determinant of the shopping trip than any particular commodity separately. Of the individual commodity coefficients only tobacco and liquor prices were significantly negative as a rule, while the coefficient on apparel was persistently of the wrong sign and often significantly different from zero. The latter is an anomaly in this study and may suggest that the inability to detect the location of clothing purchases does not limit effectively the ability to satisfy particular clothing demands without increasing the number of cross border trips. 30 The Wald test for the ten (eight) variables describing the short run adjustment process (long run) of the SAMEDAY error correction model yields an F statistic of 4.37 (49.1) and an implied probability of .000003 (.0000001) that the variables jointly have no explanatory power. 31 In the exploratory stage of the empirical work I used the current period together with two lags for both the bundled commodity price and the exchange rate to better account for the short run adjustment process. The lagged variable was then dropped if found to be insignificant. For the bundled price, the first lag was insignificant in both forms of the test but was significant at the second lag for individual crossings. In the case of the exchange rate, the lagged coefficient was typically larger and more likely to be different from zero than the contemporaneous value, while the coefficient on the second lag was generally insignificantly different from zero.
long run effect. Doing so results in a long run coefficient estimate for PRBUNDLE that is less than half the size of its short run counterpart. 32 The same kind of result is found for the change in the exchange rate. 33 Together these findings suggest that short term border crossings exaggerate the mobility results that can be expected over the longer run. The presence of the second lagged relative price term in the individual equation, D (PRBUNDLE(-2)) , and the first lagged exchange rate, D(EXCH(-1)) in both, add persistence to the overshooting response and suggest that information other than coordination difficulties will be important in explaining shopping response through time.
34
The separation of the unemployment rate into HPURATE and DEVURATE works only moderately well as a test of the time versus income hypotheses. Transitory deviations from the trend in the unemployment rate, D(DEVURATE), are positively related to changes in cross border travel as predicted, but both coefficient estimates can be considered significantly different from zero only under the most liberal interpretation of the confidence interval (at 10 percent). Supporting that more liberal interpretation is the consideration that the time hypothesis requires the predicted response to be purely transitory producing additional shopping only in the short run. Hence the finding in the two equations that the long run coefficient on DEVURATE(-1) is considerably smaller than the short run coefficient and insignificantly different from zero is consistent with that hypothesis. Along these lines it is also interesting to note that same-day crossings by individuals are more responsive to temporary changes in unemployment than are automobile crossings. This suggests the severity of the 1990-92 Canadian recession as an additional factor in explaining the 1988-93 period of widespread cross border shopping. Hence, while the number of passengers per automobile declined consistently across the entire 1972-98 time period, the episode of widespread cross border shopping by Canadians does stand out as the one time period where this downward trend was reversed, even if only temporarily. Changes in the Hodrick-Prescott trend, however, are not consistent with the hypothesis that permanently higher levels of unemployment reduce household income and so decrease cross border shopping. In both equations the short run coefficient, D(HPURATE), has the expected negative sign, but neither the short nor the long run coefficients are significantly different from zero.
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It is in relation to the tests of institutional and shopping regimes that the equations present their most interesting positive findings. First, the data is strongly consistent with the hypothesis that the U.S./Canada Free trade agreement, USFTA, by reducing the time and other bureaucratic costs of crossing the border, has increased same-day cross border travel and the potential for cross border shopping. This is reflected somewhat in the size and significance of the short run adjustment coefficients, but is represented even more strongly in the persistence and size of the long run coefficients of the er- 32 The long run coefficient associated with PRBUNDLE(-1) is -315131.2 which is less than half of that estimated for ∆PRBUNDLE (-754987.0). 33 Here the long run coefficient estimate is -390,442.6, which is roughly one-third of the short run adjustment coefficient of -1288294.6. 34 Recent work by Vilasuso and Menz (1998) suggests that individuals respond asymmetrically to changes in domestic versus foreign variables. Their analysis highlights information costs in predicting the size and timing of cross border flows. 35 It does remain true, however, that separation does provide a better fit with the data than does the single aggregate and to the extent that this division does allow a better test time and income hypotheses, the data is consistent with the time hypothesis but not the income hypothesis.
ror correction term. 36 The U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement, soon followed by the North American Free Trade Agreement, resulted in a large increase in sameday cross border travel. What is less certain is whether that larger flow actually reflects an increase in cross border shopping.
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The Sunday shopping hypothesis offers an alternative test of the time cost of shopping and here the error correction formulation captures some of the most interesting features of the data. Of the three dummy variables, SUNannounced, the announcement of the political decision not to enforce Sunday closing laws in Ontario (followed by widespread retail store opening) might have been expected to have had the biggest effect on shopping convenience in the short run and hence to have produced the largest fall in the cost of shopping domestically relative to crossing the border. 38 As expected, the data does suggest that shoppers did react immediately to the decision not to enforce the Sunday restrictions rather than wait until their formal removal a year later, SUN/ONTARIO. The short run announcement coefficient, D(SUN/announced), dominates in size and significance the date at which the legislation was finally passed D(SUN/ONTARIO). When the long run coefficients in the error correction term are examined, however, the two are reversed and the date of legislation can be seen to have greater explanatory power. 39 In part this may be because many Ontario retailers would commit fully to longer term reorganization only when the opportunities presented by late night and Sunday shopping were recognized to be permanent. 40 The general tenor of the findings reinforces earlier observations on the importance of when information arrives and adds to this the distinction between temporary and permanent change for explaining shopping behavior and hence the timing of cross border flows. Finally, neither equation showed any significant cross border response to the deregulation of mid-to small sized food stores in Quebec in the short run, D(SUN/QUEBEC). Both short run coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. In the long run, however, the results are perverse-cross border travel increases despite increasing domestic shopping convenience. This is one exception to the general rule that short run effects are larger than long run effects. 37 In an earlier version of the paper I noted that USFTA produced a stronger empirical effect on same-day crossings using the month before the treaty was actually implemented. Because new regulations would not generally be implemented before the treaty actually came into effect, this would suggest either that shopping was not the only cross border activity enhanced by the prospect of a treaty or that cross border shopping relies on information and attitudes towards cross border travelers that depend as much on attitude as they do on the enforcement of formal rules and regulations. 38 Ontario represents about 40 percent of Canada in terms of both population and income while Quebec is about 25 percent. In addition, Quebec's deregulation in 1990 covered a relatively small subset of retail stores (middle to small grocery stores). 39 While all four long run coefficient estimates have the expected negative sign, the coefficients of the date of legislation (SUN/ONTARIO) are double the size of the announcement dummy and both significantly different from zero (using a 5 percent confidence interval). Comparing the short and long run, the short run announcement coefficient is roughly a third larger than the long run effect of legislated Sunday closings in Ontario (140, 221) . 40 The year between the Rae announcement and the passing of new store hour legislation was one of intense debate over the form and substance of the proposed legislation. In general labor unions argued against greater liberalization, communities adjacent to the border argued for Sunday shopping, and large retailers such as Eatons and the Bay split on the issue. See Ferris (1991) . 41 This is the only shopping hypothesis directly contradicted by the data. Combined with other anomalous findings (see footnote 8), a more detailed study of Quebec's cross border travel seems warranted and would make an interesting special study.
Aside from the case of Quebec, the timing of regulatory change with respect to shopping in Canada and its effect on cross border travel suggests the deliberate use of regulation by some Canadian governments to stem the flood of cross border shopping that followed the dramatic rise in the value of the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S. dollar and peaked with the adoption of the GST. Without suggesting equivalency, these finding are consistent with the hypothesis that institutional/ regulatory change complement and sometimes substitute for more traditional policy incentives to guide individual behaviour (such as through tax reductions or greater enforcement activity). Viewed from a broader perspective, these findings suggest that greater Canada/U.S. openness may have begun a competition among political jurisdictions that has resulted in greater uniformity in a wider range of shopping characteristics. Not only may open borders bring tax rates and structures into greater conformity, but political competition may also induce uniformity in organizational structures and regulatory practices. With either closed borders or costly crossings, countries have greater scope to bundle the package of services, taxes, institutions and regulations that best suit their average constituent. 42 Open borders, on the other hand, induce competition not only at the level of the bundled aggregate but also along each of the bundle's margins. Because competition among jurisdictions is always for the marginal rather than the average individual, open borders privilege the tastes of the most mobile. From this perspective it is not always clear that greater mobility will enhance the efficiency of governmental institutions.
Finally, the error correction coefficients in each equation are negative, as predicted, and both are significantly different from zero. As an indicator of the rate of adjustment, the small size of the coefficient estimates suggests that adjustment to long run equilibrium will be long and protracted. The protracted nature of adjustment is also indicated by the number and pattern of lagged dependent variable terms that were found to be statistically significant in the short run part of the model, reinforcing the earlier finding that short run coefficients were typically larger than their long run counterparts. Together these findings underline a theme that has arisen at various earlier stages in the analysis-that is, the need to better understand the role of information and other transactions costs to explain the length and pattern of the adjustment process.
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
In the previous section I test for the predicted sign and statistical significance of the key shopping variables and find results that are strongly consistent with the model. In this section I turn to the question of economic significance by measuring the size of the estimated effects on cross border travel following substantive commodity tax changes and ask the related question of whether the magnitudes involved imply a tax revenue loss substantial enough to merit explicit policy attention. To focus this analysis I use the first equation of the error correction model in Table 1 to assess the size of the impact and longer run effect of the GST.
The quantitative response to the GST is implied by the estimated response by individuals to actual relative price and other variable changes that followed the imposition of the GST in January of 1991. All studies of the impact of the GST find that the substitution of the GST for the Federal Manufacturer's sales tax did result in an overall rise in consumer prices and that this rise was spread over the first few months of 1991. 43 Using the short run PRBUNDLE coefficients and attributing all of the actual change in PRBUNDLE to the GST, the model implies that the GST resulted in an increase in cross border shoppers of slightly less than 100,000 per month or about 1,140,000 per year. 44 The substitution of a broad 7 percent value added tax for a thirteen percent manufacturer's sales tax would have also been expected to lead to an increase (decrease) in Canadian exports (imports), strengthening the value of the Canadian dollar and lowering the exchange rate. On the empirical side, however, few exchange rate studies have attributed any change in the exchange rate to the GST, rather attributing the rise in the value of the Canadian dollar in that period to restrictive Bank of Canada monetary policy. 45 If I attribute all of the January/February 1991 fall in the exchange rate to the GST, the equation coefficients would imply an additional 160,000 crossings per month. 46 Using the absence of any exchange rate effect as a lower bound and its total inclusion as an upper bound, the estimates of the error correction model suggest a short run increase in the number of cross border shoppers of between 100 and 250,000 per month (or 1-3 million additional crossings per year). As discussed above, the model suggests that the long run effect will be much smaller. Treating the change in relative prices and exchange rates by March, 1991 as the appropriate measure of the permanent change following the GST, the model suggests at most 50,000 additional cross border shoppers per month (600,000 per year).
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While the absolute size of the travel response in the short run underlines the quantitative importance of our earlier statistical findings, the total tax revenue loss that follows a new tax program is much harder to estimate. In terms of tax losses arising from cross border shopping, it includes more than just the losses arising from consumers who now choose to substitute cross border shopping for domestic retail sales. Rather, the total cross border revenue loss will include the intramarginal foregone sales tax from the purchases of individuals who already crossed the border to shop. However, only for sales tax programs already in existence (such as for existing provincial sales taxes) will the new tax losses arising from added cross border shopping be due entirely to the GST. 48 Together with the full tax revenue loss arising from the marginal shopper, and even though the ability to avoid the GST was not necessary as an incentive for intramarginal cross border shopping, their unwillingness to voluntarily declare cross border purchases on their return will further expand the loss in tax revenues for the federal government.
Estimates of personal expenditures by same-day Canadian travelers in the United States are made quarterly by Statistics Canada from voluntary responses to questionnaires handed out to a sample 43 The Bank of Canada (1991), for example, estimates that the GST accounted for a 2.22 percent rise in the CPI by May of 1991. The delay in the full impact of the GST is due, in part, to many retailers choosing to incorporate "we'll pay the GST" sales into the post-Christmas retail sale period. See also Clancy and Smith (1991 of returning travelers. 49 Because individuals cannot be expected to self report evidence of illegal activities (despite promised anonymity), such data can be expected to contain a serious under reporting bias. Nevertheless, using that estimate of average same-day expenditures of $29.21 per person, the 7 percent GST loss per trip would be roughly $2.00. 50 On this basis, the short run incremental tax loss due to induced cross border shopping would have been between 2 and 500,000 a month (or $2.5 to 6 million dollars a year). Since these new cross border shoppers will not pay provincial sales taxes, a roughly equivalent tax loss will arise for the provinces. 51 The intramarginal GST loss is much larger. With slightly more than $59 million same-day border crossings in 1991, the incremental GST tax loss would have been in the order of $110 million per year. Together these figures suggest a GST tax loss of $120 million dollars a year.
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It does seems likely, however, that the ability to realize a $2.00 tax savings by crossing the border to shop would be insufficient to overcome inertia let alone cover the inconvenience and other costs of cross border shopping. Such savings would not generate the significant price response implied by the equation estimates. 53 Put in a slightly different way, a single gasoline fill up of 50 imperial litres would have led to a $5.00 saving to each Canadian shopper and, even without counting the GST levied on gasoline sales, tax revenue losses to federal and provincial governments in Canada of over $10.00. 54 Similarly, the tax savings (loss) made by the consumer (Canadian government) when bringing back even one carton of (200) cigarettes was over $25. It is then not unreasonable to expect a higher tax revenue loss than the self reported figure of $2.00 used above. On the basis of $10.00/person, the aggregate tax loss implied by this analysis would be $600 million per year in the short run. This corresponds to about 4 percent of the $15.2 billion in GST collections realized in the 1991/92 fiscal year.
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While the tax loss associated with individuals not declaring U.S. goods when crossing back into Canada is large, the confluence of a transitory change in the exchange rate, particularly heavy excise duties on particular products (such as tobacco) and the new federal GST also led to an extraordinary period of organized smuggling and further tax loss. It is unclear exactly how much of the smuggling effect can be attributed directly to the GST; nevertheless, it is clear that the unpopularity of the GST served to legitimize smuggling flows and that the size of the tax losses due to smuggling were substantial. Direct evidence on the scale of (professional) cross border tax evasion comes from the Canadian Auditor General's 1996 special review of the Excise Tax Act in relation to four specific products in the early 49 See Kemp (1992) for a description of the survey methods and conceptual issues involved in measuring these flows. 50 Kemp (1992) , Table 1 , Column (2), p.5.7. 51 Except for Alberta, all provinces have sales taxes running between 6 and 12 percent (as of August, 1991).
Ontario's provincial sales tax rate was 8 percent, implying a cross border tax loss slightly larger than the federal GST tax loss. 52 The permanent loss associated with each case is roughly one-fifth of the short run size. 53 In 1991 the large volume of cross border traffic often led to two to three hour waits on the weekends to pass through customs. 54 In August 1991, the federal excise tax was 8.5 cents per litre and provincial taxes ranged from 13.7 and 9 cents a litre. The further addition of the GST (and often provincial sales taxes) to the excise tax inclusive price means that roughly one-half of the pump price goes to taxes. nineties: tobacco, alcohol, jewelry, and motive fuels. 56 In that report the Auditor General finds that due to smuggling, total tobacco tax revenues actually declined between 1991 and 1994, with tax losses peaking at over $2 billion in 1993 (18-10). The Auditor General also reports that "The major problem with respect to alcohol is the evasion of excise duty . . . accomplished largely through smuggling . . . and by the diversion of exports and illegal production" (18-10). The border also played a significant role for motor fuels as evasion arose "through the diversion . . . from tax-exempt to taxable uses, . . . of products destined for export, and illegal production" with estimated losses of roughly $55 million in 1993 (18-10).
In some respects the 1991-93 period was anomalous, particularly for tobacco smuggling. However, even following the dramatic cutting of federal and provincial tax rates in February 1994, the tax revenue losses due to cross border smuggling remain a significant concern. Table 2 presents the Auditor General's estimates of revenue loss from tax evasion for each product relative to tax collections. As much as 10 percent of potential revenue continues to be lost due to tax evasion, with a substantial part of that loss coming from cross border smuggling. 57 In aggregate terms, the tax loss arising from organized smuggling activity is at least three times as large as the losses arising from individual's cross border shopping.
While it is tempting to conclude from this exercise that cross border shopping in its most general sense is a significant constraint on tax policy for Canada, the problematic nature of many of our assumptions calls for somewhat greater caution. What does seem unambiguous, however, is that the combination of individual cross border shopping and professional smuggling produced quantitatively significant tax losses during the implementation period of the GST. As important, the significance of the response of cross border travel to the prices of goods that can be smuggled questions the size and importance of self-reported average expenditure data (for same-day cross border travel) reported by Statistics Canada and used in policy analysis (e.g., Di Matteo, 1993; and Boisvert and Thirsk, 1994) . The expectation that in voluntary surveys individuals will have "no valid reason to misreport, since the form is completely anonymous" (Kemp, 1992 , p. 5.5) does not seem justifiable for activities that are ille- gal. Individuals should be expected to understate their involvement in these activities, partly because they expect to repeat them in the future.
CONCLUSION
What, then, has accounted for the dramatic rise and fall of cross border shopping that took place in Canada between 1989 and 1994? This analysis suggests many causes: the substantive fall in the Canadian exchange rate (that proved to be transitory); a particularly sharp rise in unemployment rates associated with the 1990-92 recession; increasingly heavy taxes on particular "sin" products in Canada relative to the U.S. (such as liquor and tobacco); and the arrival of a free trade agreement that accelerated the adoption of a value added tax, discretely increasing the price of final retail goods in Canada relative to the U.S. The size of the tax loss produced by cross border tax evasion, discussed in the previous section, provides at least one reason for the dramatic decline in cross border shopping. That is, the size of the tax losses and smuggling activities associated with tobacco led Canadian governments to dramatically lower tobacco taxes (halving tobacco prices). This had an immediate impact on both professional tobacco smuggling and individual cross border shopping. 58 As significant has been the rise of the exchange rate back to (and beyond) its pre-1988/89 level. Even with these changes, however, the continued importance of the GST as a revenue source suggests that cross border shopping will continue to constrain the ability of the federal and provincial governments to use sales taxes to tax Canadians differentially.
Even though the major portion of the revenue loss from cross border shopping arises from professional smuggling, changes in cross border travel may register changes in the intensity of cross border tax evasion on the political process more effectively than do foregone taxes. The demonstration effect of hundreds of thousands of Canadians clogging border crossing stations seems to have been successful in politically capping the GST and may have been instrumental in inducing regulatory change and changing tax policy. The liberalization of Canada's shopping hour regulations has already been noted, but even the composition of tax revenue collections may have been changed by this experience. Prior to the period of widespread cross border shopping, provincial sales taxes and a variety of "sin" taxes were popular funding choices for new government initiatives. Since the Free Trade Agreement and the adoption of the GST, payroll taxes have come to replace sales taxes as the tax instrument of choice.
59 This is consistent with the belief that payroll taxes offer fewer opportunities for evasion.
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All of this suggests that ever greater cross border mobility between the U.S. and Canada has increased the cost of sustaining significant differences in corporate, sales, and income taxes. Whether these considerations help to explain the recent pressure on the size and rate of growth of government requires further analysis. However, it seems safe to con-58 Again using the parameters of the model, the rise in PRBUNDLE from 1.46 to 1.72 in February, 1994 resulted in a short run fall (over three months) in the number of cross border trips of slightly over 400,000 per month and a long run response about 80,000 fewer trips per month. 59 The increasing importance of payroll taxes as a revenue source for governments was the subject of a forum at the 1998 Canadian Economic Association Meetings in Ottawa, since published in the September, 1998 issue of Canadian Public Policy. The William Robson and William Scarth introduction setting the tone for that session begins, " [T] he upward trend in Canadian payroll taxes over the years, and the prospect of further hikes, raises a number of questions." 60 A recent concern within policy circles in Canada over brain drain losses to the U.S. suggests that payroll and income tax differences are increasingly recognized as allocative (cross border) in their effect.
clude that open borders have increased the cost of maintaining a rate of growth for government in Canada that exceeds the rate of growth in the U.S. Whether this prediction for government size translates into a gain or loss in Canadian welfare is more difficult to assess. The constraint on public goods implied by the ability to evade taxation using the border restricts Canadian welfare if the level of provision chosen by the median voter mirrors the choice of the average Canadian. On the other hand, welfare will rise if the median voter bears less than his or her share of cost and imposes too high a level of public output.
